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Longitudinal Analyses
of the Effects of Trade Unions
AR S TRACT
This paper examines how measurement error biases longitudinal estimates of
union effects. It develops numerical examples, statistical models, andecono-
metric estimates which indicate that measurement error is a major problem in
longitudinal data sets, so that longitudinal analyses do not provide the
research panacea for determining the effects of unionism (or other economic
forces) some have suggested. There are three major findings:
1) The difference between the cross—section and longitudinal estimates is
attributable in large part to random error in the measurement of whochanges
union status. Given modest errors of measurement, of the magnitudesobserved,
and a moderate proportion of workers changing union status, also of themagnitu-
des observed, measurement error biases downward estimated effects of unionsby
substantial amounts.
2) Longitudinal analysis of the effects of unionism onnonwage and wage
outcomes tends to confirm the significant impact of unionism found in cross—
section studies, with the longitudinal estimates of bothnonwage and wage out-
comes lover in the longitudinal analysis than in the cross—section analysis
of the same data set.
3) The likely upward bias of cross—section estimates of the effect of
unions and the likely downward bias of longitudinal estimatessuggests that,
under reasonable conditions, the two sets of estimates bound the "true" union







Longitudinal Analyses of the Effects of Trade Unions
But union members are different from nonmembers in unobserved
ways, biasing your estimates. You should...make a selectivity
bias correction...simultaneOusly determine union status and
economic outcoznes...develop an unobservables model...USE
LONGITUDINAL DATA.
archtetypical comment on virtually any study of the economic
effects of unionism, or suitably modified, on any other empirical
subject
Longitudinal data, which follow the same worker over time, offer
researchers a potentially valuable way to examine often—raised objections to the
findings of cross—section studies. Unlike complex "structuralmodel" approaches
to cross-section data problems, which often yield unstable and uninformative
results (Freeman and Medoff 1981), longitudinal data offer a distinctively dif-
ferent "experiment" for uncovering the effects of changes in economic variables.
In the case of unions, what is a more natural way to study what unions do than
to compare economic outcomes for workers (firms) before and after they change
union status?
This paper presents a critical analysis of the "natural experiment." In
contrast to the archetypical comment cited above, it argues that longitudinal
analyses do not provide a research panacea for determining the effects of
unionism (or other economic forces). The main reason for this is the substan-
tial impact of measurement or misclassification error of the union (other
economic) variable on longitudinal work.
The paper is divided into four sections. Section I develops briefly the
statistical models used in this (and other) longitudinal investigations of what
unions do. Section II examines the effect of measurement error in union status2
on estimated effects of unionism in cross—section and longitudinal studies.
Section III presents the results of estimating the effect of unionism on out-
comes in four longitudinal and cross—section data sets. In contrast to other
empirical analyses using longitudinal data, it treats two market outcomes which
are at the center of the "voice—response" face of unionism, dispersion of wages
and provision of fringe benefits, as well as wages. Section IV considers the
argument that cross—section and longitudinal estimates of union effects "bound"
the trueimpactof unionism.
There are three basic findings:
1) The difference between the cross—section and longitudinal estimates is
attributable in large part to random error in the measurement of who changes
union status. Given modest errors of measurement, of the magnitudes observed,
and a moderate proportion of workers changing union status, also of the magnitu-
des observed, measurement error biases downward estimated effects of unions by
substantial amounts.
2) Longitudinal analysis of the effects of unionism on nonwage and wage
outcomes tends to confirm the significant impact of unionism found in cross—
section studies, with the longitudinal estimates of both nonwage and wage out-
comes lower in the longitudinal analysis than in 'the cross—section analysis
of the same data set.
3) The likely upward bias of cross—section estimates of the effect of
unions and the likely downward bias of longitudinal estimates suggests that,
under reasonable conditions, the two sets of estimates bound the "true" union
impact posited in standard models of what unions do.
All told, the paper concludes that because of measurement error and likely
selectivity of who changes union status longitudinal analysis is a useful tool3
for "checking on" the result the cross—section studies but may very well yield
worse estimates of the parameters of interest.
I. Longitudinal Models of What Unions Do
The standard cross—section analysis of the impact of collective bargaining
on the economic outcome or behavior of individual workers (or firms) involves a
multivariate statistical equation of the form
0. =a+ bU. + cX. + U. (1)
1 1 1 1
where 0. =outcomefor person i,
dichotomous unionization variable (1 =covered,0 =notcovered),
=controlvariables (education, sex) assumed constant over time, and
U. =errorterm.
1
The recurrent objection to estimates based on (i) is that because of selectivity
of union workers U. is likely to be positively correlated with U1, leading to an
overstatement of the union effect. Since, as Abowd and Farber (1982) have
stressed, who gets a union job results from the decisions of both employers and
workers, the selectivity argument depends on whose decision dominates the hiring
process. In the case of wages it is generally assumed that, given highunion
wages, firms select ure able workers from the queue facing them, producing
E(uU.) > 0. In the case of nonwage outcomes, it is oftenclaimed that workers
sort themselves in such a way- that those who have strong desires for union—tThe
work conditions and nodes of compensation (and would thus obtain xmre of those
outcomes in nonunion settings that the randomly chosen worker) choose union
jobs. In this case firms either are indifferent or prefer those workers as well
(since they will be nxre satisfied).
Longitudinal data provides a way to deal with the correlation between4
unionism and the error term. Assuming that the part of u that is correlated
with U. is an individual effect constant over time, so that =
a1
+ with
E(1 U) =0,addition of individual constants (which can be viewed as a form
of differencing) will eliminate the correlation between and In a two—
period linear model one obtains
°it =b1J1t
+ (2)
where takes the values —1, 0, 1. A multivariate analysis of (2) will yield
the desired b as long as the change in union status is properly measured and is
uncorrelated with the change in the random part of the error term.
Equation (2) can be readily generalized to exploit more fully the longitu-
dinal data by allowing different changes in union status to have different
effects on wages. In particular, we can allow changes in outcomes to differ









whereUU, UN, NU, and NN are dummy variables that take the values 1 or 0
depending on the union status in the two periods:
VU =1,if union in both periods;
UN1, if union in period 1, nonunion in period 2;
NU =1,if nonunion in period 1, union in period 2;
NN =1,if nonunion in each period;
and where the constant term has been suppressed.
Equation (3) shows that the before/after nature of the experiment permits
calculation of three different union effects, each answering a somewhat dif-
ferent question:
(1) What happens to nonunion workers who join unions compared to nonunion
workers who remain nonunion (obtained as the difference between the coefficients5
on NU and NN, NU —NN,for short)?
(2) What happens to union workers who leave the union compared to those
who remain union (UN -U1J)?
(3) Among workers who change, what happens to those who join a union as
compared to those who leave a union ((UN —NU)/2or some such other average)?
It can be readily seen that when union differential is constant over time
(UI! =NN)and when the effects of joining and leaving unions are the same in
absolute value (NU—NN =UN—uu),Equation(3) collapses into Equation
(2). Less restrictively, if the only reasons for (3) to differ from (2) are
changes in union differentials over time, the estimated parameters will fulfill
the equality in absolute values given above, that is, the only difference bet-
ween the gains of workers who join unions versus those who leave is the changed
union differential over time.
Equations (2) and (3) can be readily generalized to analyze data covering
more than two periods. The natural extension of (2) is to a fixed effects model
with individual constants (differences from mean values) for each person. The
natural extension of (3) is to a model with dummy variables for all possible
classifications of changes in status. For ease of exposition in this paper I
treat only the two—period case.
Interpreting Longitudinal Results
Assuming that E(aU1) > 0, the longitudinal estimates of union impact
should be lower than cross—section estimates. In fact, empirical analyses of
wages do indeed show a lower impact of unionism in longitudinal than in cross-
section data, providing support for the "omitted ability bias" model given above
(among the panel studies are Duncan 19777, 1979; Brown 1980; Mellow 1981; MincerC
1981; Chamberlain 1982). In Chamberlain's analysis, for example, addition of
individual constants reduces the union coefficient by 32% to 44%, indicating "a
substantial heterogeneity (ability) bias." The union wage effect still stands,
but its magnitude is smaller than in traditional cross—section analysis. As the
archetypical comment at the beginning of the paper indicates, many have
interpreted the smaller longitudinal estimates as providing better estimates of
the true union effects than the larger cross—section estimates. Indeed, under
the fixed—effect assumptions that changes in union status are properly measured
and that selectivity of changers does not produce a correlation of the error in
the change—in—outcome equation with changes—in—status, the longitudinal estimate
is unbiased.
Are these assumptions likely to be valid in empirical work? What does
their violation do to longitudinal estimates of union effects?
This paper argues that neither assumption is likely to be valid and that,
under reasonable conditions, measurement error and selectivity of changers will
bias downward longitudinal estimates of union effects. Because in practice
measurement error appears to be the principal econometric problem in analysis of
longitudinal data, I focus largely on the measurement error issue.
II. The Problem of Measurement Error
In cross—section studies of unionism, one generally ignores measurement
erro in the union status variable on the assumption that only a small number of
workers are likely to be misclassified and thus that any bias in the estimated
union coefficient due to measurement error is modest. Misclassification of a
small number of workers will, however, produce a much larger error in longitudi-
nal than in cross—section analysis and thus cannot be readily ignored. The
reason for the greater error is twofold. On the one hand, random nasclassifica—7
Table 1
Example of Measurement Error Effect






B. Longitudinal Data Set
Observed Consisting of With observed
True means of
1 2
UU 13 13U13 1.301.30
UN 12 911N,1UU,2NN 1.25 1.03
NU 12 9NIJ,1UU,2NN 1.031.25
NN 63 61 NN, 1 UN, 1 NU 1 .0041 .0040
tionof workers in two periods will produce a larger number of misclassified
workers than random misclassification in one period. On the other hand, by
obtaining information on union effects from generally small numbers of changers,
the longitudinal analysis will contain a smaller number of correct observations.
As a result the proportion of observations in error will be much larger in the
longitudinal analysis than in the cross—section analysis, producing a larger
bias.
A numeric example illustrates the dramatically different effect of modest
misclassification on cross—section and longitudinal estimates. Assume we have a
sample of 100 workers, of whom 25 are union members and 75 are not. Assume
measurement error is such that 2 union workers are misclassified and 2 nonunion
workers are misclassified.1 Then we have the situation shown in Table lA. If
the true value of the outcome variable is 1 .00 for nonunion workers and 1 .30 for
union workers, our estimated means would be 1 .28 and 1 .01, giving an estimated
differential of 27%, a value that is 10% below the true impact of unionism.
Assume that 20 workers switch union status in the period, 10 joining and
10 leaving unions. With 4 workers misclassified in each period, so that 8% of
union workers and 2.7% of nonunion workers are incorrectly classified, it can be
demonstrated (see Equation 12) that the longitudinal data set will be approxima-
tely as shown in Table lB.
There are three points to note about this data set. First, the longitudi-
nal estimates of the union effect from NU and UN comparisons are the same:
1.25/1.03 or 21%, which is 30% below the true impact of unionism—— an atte-
nuation that is three times as large as that in the cross-section analysis.
Second, measurement error produces a pattern of differences in levels of wages
between the four sets: for example, workers measured as leaving unions have a9
lower wage in period 1 than workers who remain union, workers measured as
joining unions have a higher wage in period 1 than workers who remain nonunion,
and so on. Third, the best estimate of the difference in wages in the data is
the comparison of the mean level of wages for the UU set with the mean level for
the NN set, which yields essentially the correct 30% differential. For this to
be the best estimate of the union effect, however, workers in the two sets would
have to be otherwise identical, contrary to the assumed E(a±U) > 0
More formally, I compare what measurement error in the dichotomous union
status variable does to the estimated union coefficient in cross—section
Equation (1) to what measurement error in the change in union status variable
does to the estimated union coefficient in longitudinal Equation (2). Because
of the restricted values of union status or change in status, the measurement
error is correlated with the workers' true status, so that the standard measure-
ment error in regression analysis must be modified, along lines set out by
Aigner (1973) and by Marquis et. al.(1981).2
Consider first measurement error in a dichotomous variable. Let M
measured union status, U =actualstatus, and eerror. Then
M=Ue (4)
where possible errors are: —1, if a person's true status is union (ui), pro-
ducing a nonunion classification (M =0),and 1, if a person's true status is
nonunion (u =0),producing a union classification (N i).
Now let rU be the probability that a union worker is misclassified and
rN is the probabilitythat a nonunion worker is misclassified and 1 —rand
1 —rN
be the corresponding probabilities that the workers are correctly





















where v is a random variable with mean zero and variance ci.
The effect of regressing an outcome 0 on N rather than on U can be eva-
luated by substituting (6') into the true equation (1) and treating the random











where I have suppressed the constant term.
The bias on the coefficient on from omitting Vjisthe coefficient of
v1 in (7) times the regressioncoefficient of v on M, holding the Xe fixed.
Assuming, for ease of presentation, that N is uncorrelated with the Xe in (7),
we obtain the coefficient of v on N from (6') as a/cs, the random measurement
error component of the measured variance. Then the regression for (7) yields











Since union status is binomal, =u(i—U),where Umean proportion union. If
as in our numeric example, we assume that M U, which holds whenever rU rN(l-U),










where and b are the simple regression coefficients. Here the bias depends
on the relation between the Xs and both observed and true unionstatus. If we
assume that the random component of the measurement error is independentof






Since the bias in (10) is greater than the bias in (9), we conclude that
as long as the random component of measurement error is uncorrelatedwith the Xs
thecross—section estimate of the union effect is biased downward by at least
1 —rU-
rNpercent.3
Turningto the effect of measurement error on longitudinal estimates, we
proceed in a similar manner to the preceding analysis. In this case, the
equation relating measured and true changes in union status is
AN =AU+e, (ii)
where AN =measuredchange in union status (1,0, -i),
AU =truechange (1, 0, —i), and
e =error(2, 1, 0, —1, —2).
When rU and rN are independent over time, the relationship between the
true changes and the measured changes can be written as functions of rU and




























where v is a random error.
Equation (12) is the critical equation in our analysis. The three terms
in each equation in which an r or r is multiplied by a (1 —r)represent
misclassification errors. The terms in which (1 —r)is multiplied by (1 —r)
represent true changes in the measured observations. As before, the error term
can take on only a limited set of values, dependent on the value of the true
change. The relation between the true values of &J and the possible error is
defined as in Table 2 below.













where v is a random measurement error. Substituting (14) into (2) and applying
the omitted variable bias formula for omission of v yields for the expected















According to (16) the downward bias in the longitudinal analysis will
exceed the downward bias iii the cross—section analysis as long as a2 < 2
AU AM13
Table 2
Relation Between True Value of t1J and Possible Error
Frequencyof Error Assuming True Value of tU
Error 1 0 -1
2 0 0 rUrN
1 0 (1_rN)rN +(1_r)r rN(1_rU) +rU(1_rN)
0 1_(rN+ rU.rUrN) 1_2[(1_rN)rN_(1_rU)rU] 1_(rN+rU_rUrN)

















For ease of analysis, assume that the true mean of unionism, (U), is constant
over time and that there is no constant response bias, E(N) = U. But it can be
shown (Marquis, et. al. 1981, p. 101) that MUN depends on
2 2 E(MUN) = (i -rU
-
TN)TUN + M





where = (1 —r)rU
+(1—rN)rN(1
-ID, theaverage variance of the measure-
ment error.
With constant U, Tu = TNU. Now let T be the proportion of workers
changing union status in the sample (Tc = TUN +T).Then (17) simplifies to
= Tc, (19)
while substitution of (18) into (17') yields
= (1 —r
—rN)Tc+ 26 . (19')
Equation (19') is an approximation due to the absence of terms reflecting the
equation—specific error terms (VUN, v of [12]).
2 2
The key question is will ajjalwaysbe less than
Examination of (19) —(19')shows the answer to be negative. When
measurement error is large so that (1 —rU
—
TN)
is close to zero and when
is large > For example, let rU = rN = .40 and U (' r/(r +TN))
= .50.
Then = .O4TC +.48,so that for> ' >o. In this case, measure-
ment error biases the cross—section estimate more than the longitudinal esti-
mate.15
Onthe other hand, when measurement error is modest, ——ain our earlier
numeric example ——willbe less than for moderate values of Tc, producing
a greater downward bias in the longitudinal calculation.
Since the effect of measurement error on longitudinal as opposed to cross-
section analysis thus depends on the magnitudes of the various parametersin the
measurement error formula, I turn next to estimates of the critical magnitudes.
Evidence on Measurement Error
The first parameters needed to evaluate the importance of measurement
error are the actual errors themselves ——rVand rN.I have identified two sur-
veys which provide the type of informationneeded to estimate and rN:
separate measures of the union status of the same workersat essentially the
same time. The first survey is a special supplement to the January1977 Current
Population Survey, which asked workers whether or not they werecovered by
collective bargaining and then asked their employers the same question. The
second is the May 1979 Current Population Survey which asked workers about their
collectivebargaining status on the "dual job" supplement and on the "pension"
supplement. While there are differences in the timing of the questionsin both
surveys, the time differences are sufficiently slight sothat differences in
answersprovides us with a reasonable first-order approximation torandom
measurement error in union status.
Table 3 tabulates the responses to these two surveys. It shows that while
rU and rN are, as stated,modest in value, they are sufficiently non negligible
to produce potentially large response error bias in longitudinal data. Inthe
1979 CPS sample 6.4 to 8.1% of workers in the union category aremisclassified,
and 1.9 to 2.3% of those in the nonunion category giving a value of 8.7 to10.0%16
Table 3
Misclassificationof Union Status on Two Surveys
A. Current Population Survey, May1979
Covered by Collective Covered by Collective Bargaining
Bargaining on Main Survey on Pension Supplement
yes no total
yes 3,976 272 4,248
row (%) 93.6 6.4
column (%) 91.9 1.9 23.2
no 321 13,688 14,009
row (%) 2.3 97.7
colu.mn (%) 8.1 98.1 76.8
Total 4,297 13,950 18,257
row (%) 23.5 76.5 100
B. Employer -EmployeeMatched Survey, January 1977
Covered by Collective Covered by Collective Bargaining
Bargaining, by Employers by Employees or Household Respondent
yes no total
yes 707 57 764
row (%) 92.5 7.5
column (%) 92.5 2.3 23.2
no 57 2,476 2,533
row (%) 2.3 47.8 76.8
coluin (%) 7.5 97.8
Total 764 2,533 3,297
row (%) 23.2 76.8 100
Source: A, tabulated from May 1979 CPS.
B, tabulated from January 1977 Employee Employer Matched Sample.17
for the critical r +rN
figure. In the 1977 matched employer —enploye
sample, 7.5% of workers in the union category aremisclassified and2.3 of
thosein the nonunion category giving a 9.8% value to r+
rN.
To check whether the differences in classification onthe samples can, in
fact, be interpreted as resulting from randommeasurement error, I have esti-
mated union wage equations for the sample of workers forwhom there are
conflicting estimates of union status, and for the samplefor whom there are no
such conflicts. If the conflict in responses is due torandom misclassifica-
tion, one wouldexpectno significant union wage effect for personsin the
sample in which estimates conflict, compared to asizeable union effect in the
sample for which there are no conflicts inwhether a person is union or not. As
can be seen in the unnumbered table below,estimates of standard log wage
equations (with the usual demographic and human capitalcontrols) for the




estimatedunion coefficient (standard error) .26 (.02) +.05(.07)
May —June1979 sample
estimated union coefficient (standard error) .21 (.01) +.06(.07)
where the +beforethe coefficient reflects the change in sign depending on
which estimate of unionism is used as the independentvariable.
Finally, taking the magnitudes of the estimatedmisclassification errors
in Table 3 as valid, we can apply the formulas givenearlier to evaluate the
impact of measurement error on regressionestimates of union impacts, given dif-
ferent proportions of workers trulychangingunion status. As can be seen in
Table 14, when only 5% of workers change status the longitudinal
estimate is less
than half of cross—section estimate and just 140% ofthe true b, whereas if 15% —18
Table 4
Potential Impact of Measurement Error on Estimates of Union Effects
Proportion of Workers Estimated Bias Estimated Bias
Truly Changing in Cross—Section in Longitudinal
Union Status Estimate Estimate Relative Bias
() (a) (b) (a)/(b)
5 .90 .40 .45
10 .90 .59 .66
15 .90 .70 .78
20 .90 .77 .86
25 .90 .82 .91
30 .90 .86 .95
80 .90 1.00 1.12
Source: Calculated using formulas (9) and (19') assuming rU =7.5%,rN2.5%,
and U =.25,sO =.036.19
20% change status the estimates are closer together. Consistentwith the pre-
ceding analysis, when the proportion changing union status risesto relatively
high levels, the longitudinal estimates exceed the cross—sectionestimates.
Table 5 turns to the next obvious issue: the proportion of workerswho
actually change union status in a longitudinal data set. Itexamines the pro-
portions measured as changing status in four major longitudinal surveys:the
May 1974—75 Current Population Survey (cs), the NationalLongitudinal Survey
of Men Aged 14—24 in 1966 (NLS) for the period 1970-78, and the Qualityof
Employment Panel Survey (QES), 1973—77, and also recordsestimates of the true
proportion changing. The estimated true proportion changing areobtained by
N.and N. from (18), which yields






where Tc is the proportion of true changers, and solving for Tc. Inthe cases
where U changes over time, Equation (20) is still applicable becausethe impact
of changes in U has offsetting effects on E(MUN) and
ifl three of the samples, the calculations yielded reasonable estimatesof
the true proportion changing, and those figures are reported in thetable. In
the May CPS sample, however, the formulas yielded no estimate, becauseunder the
assumptions, measurement error by itself should have produced virtuallythe pro-
portion of changers observed.
The key finding in Table 5 is that whether one looks at themeasured pro-
portion of changers or at the estimated true proportionthe values are on the
low side of the figures in Table 4. The measured changes (Mc) rangefrom 6.2%
(cPs) to 24.2% (ilLS) while the "true" proportion changing vary from9.1% (QES)
to 21% (ilLs). With these changes, measurement error biases downwardthe longi-
tudinal estimates by 14% (NLs) to 29% (PSID) to 34% (QES) and by even larger20
amounts in the CPS, according to the estimatesin Table 2.
Insum, given measurement errors in union status that produce values of
rU +rNof about .10, andtrueproportions of workers changing status below .20,
the analysis in this section suggests that longitudinal estimates of the effect
of unionism on economic outcomes will be below cross—section estimates and, more
important, below the true effect of unionism as well.
Comparisons of Longitudinal and Cross-Section Estimates of Union Effects
As noted in Section I, there have been several studies of union wage
effects u8ing longitudinal data. These studies have found lower union effects
than are found in comparable cross—section studies. By contrast, while there is
a large and growing cross—section literature on the effects of unions on out-
comes other than level of wages, such as dispersion of wages, labor turnover
(notably quit behavior), fringe benefits, and the like (see Freeman and Medoff
[1981] for a summary), there has been little longitudinal evidence regarding the
effect of union membership on these outcomes. This section provides evidence
that for two important "nonwage" outcomes, the dispersion of wages and fringe
benefits, and for wages, longitudinal analysis yields smaller estimated union
effects than does cross—section analysis, but that the estimated effects are
still fairly sizable and economically significant. This finding leads us to
reject criticisms that the results of cross—section studies of the nonwage out-
comes are more subject to "heterogeneity" or fixed effects bias than are the
results of wage studies. As measurement error should reduce the estimated
impact of unionism on all outcomes, this is consistent with the models given in
Section II.
The analysis treats the four data sets set out in Table 5. In each case I71
Table 5
Proportion of Workers Measured as Chancing Union Status in
Diverse Surveys
Survey (Sample Size)
May 1974 Michigan National Quality of
—75 CPS Panel Survey LongitudinalEmployment





NN .714 .400 .609 .595
NU .028 .098 .160 .057
UN .034 .094 .087 .101
UU .225 .408 .149 .247
Mc (UN or Nu) .062 .192 .242 .158
U1 (UU or UN) .259 .502 .231 .348
U2 (uuorNu) .253 .506 .309 .304
Estimated T0 .117 .210 .091
urce: Tabulated from relevant survey with estimates of true UN orNU
as described in the text with rU +rN
=.10and that rN/(rU +rN)
equal the average rate of unionization in the period. Thus, for
the NLS, I set rN/(rU +rN)
=1/(.231 +.309)=.27and obtain rw =.027,
r .073. The same procedure is used for the other data sets.'Note
te I4ichigan PSID includes all of the "poverty" sample, producing
a large proportion of union workers.22
sought the largest possible sample for which the outcome variables and the union
variable were reported. In the Michigan PSID sample, in which one has a number
of possible years to examine, I report the results from a relatively long time
span, 1970—79, though I examined shorter spans as well. In contrast to some
studies, I include all of the special "poverty" sample as well as the random
sample in the survey. In the NLS sample I also chose a relatively long time
span to examine. As the May CPS sample covers one year and the QES covers three
years, the result is significant variation in the time span covered and, as seen
in Table 5, significant variation in the proportion of persons changing union
status as well.
Wages
Table 6 presents the results of my longitudinal analysis of union wage
effects in the four data sets.6 It records the log wages for the four union—
change groups before and after the change, the change in log wages, and the
implied union effects and, for comparison, the cross—section estimate of the
union wage effect in the same data. While there is some variation among the
three types of longitudinal estimates, the general pattern of results is clear:
the longitudinal calculations yield lower estimates of the union effects than do
cross—section calculations. As many longitudinal analyses focus on the dif-
ference in changes in wages between those joining and those leaving unions, the
most significant comparison is between the (im —UN)/2estimates and the cross—
section estimates.7 Consistent with the results of Mellow (1981) they show a
great reduction in the estimated union effect in the Nay 1974-75 CPS. As this
is the group with the smallest measured proportion of changers, this is to be
expected from measurement error. There is, however, one aberrant case in the23
Table 6
LogWages, Changes in Log Wages Associated with Changing
Union Status, andEstimatedUnion Effects
Log Wage Group Estimated
GroupandSurvey Before After Union Effects
A.May CPS, 1974—75
NN 1.241.34 .10 NU —NN .09
NU 1.281.47 .19 UU -UN .08
UU 1.581.67 .09 (Nu -uN)/2 .09
UN 1.461.47 .01 cross—section .19
B. National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, 1970-78
NN .97 1.84 .87 NU —NN .12
NU .941.93 .99 UU—UN .09
UU 1.34 2.05 .71 (Nu —UN)/2 .19
UN 1.22 1.84 .62 cross—section .28
C. Michigan PSID, 1970-79
NN .951.61 .67 RU -NN .08
NTJ 1.06 1.81 .75 UU —UN .26
UU 1.292.02 .73 (RU —UN)/2 .14
UN 1.16 1.63 .47 cross—section .23
D.QES, 1973—77
NN 1.381.85 .48 NU —NN .19
NU 1.24 1.91 .67 UU —UN .11
UU 1.552.00 .45 (iiu —UN)/2 .16
UN 1.351.70 .34 cross—section .14
Source: Calculated from the surveys. Cross—sectionestimates based on
rnultivariate regression model with standard set of controlsfor
demographic and human capital variables.24
table: in the QES, the (NU —U1)/2comparison yields a larger rather than
smaller estimated union effect than does the cross—section analysis. In this
case, the cross—section difference in wages was only moderately above the longi-
tudinal difference (uu and NN differ by .17 and .15) so that inclusion of
regression controls reduced the cross—section estimate to the lower level. Note
also that the pattern of differences in the log wages themselves, before and
after the change, are also generally, although not always, in line with the
impact of measurement error. The before—change log wages show that union
leavers have lower wages than union stayers, which agrees with the Section II
nwrierical example. The after—change log wages also show that union joiners have
lower wages than union stayers in all cases. By contrast, the before and after
comparisons of changers with nonunion stayers show a less consistent pattern.
Finally, if we assume that the estimates of measurement error used in
Table 5 apply to these data, we can calculate the proportion of the difference
between cross—section/longitudinal coefficients due to measurement error. To do
this we estimate the relative bias of longitudinal to cross—section estimates
from Table 4, using the estimated true proportion of changers from Table 5, and
multiply the resulting statistic by the cross—section estimate in Table 6. This
yields .24 for the NLS and .16 for the PSID as the expected estimates from the
longitudinal analyses, if measurement error were the only factor operating.
Comparing these figures to the actual longitudinal estimates in Table 6, we see
that measurement error explains 44% (NLS) to 77% (PSID) of the
cross-section/longitudinal differences. While further analysis is required to
pin down the specifics of the misclassification effects in each data set, our
analysis suggests that measurement error can explain much of the difference
ween cross—section and longitudinal estimates of union wage effects.25
This conclusion, while at odds with the widely usedfixed—effects
interpretation of the difference between longitudinaland cross-section analy-
sis, is consistent with recent evaluations by otherresearchers. Chowdhury and
Nickell (1982) who correct for measurement error bias instandard covariance
estimates by instrumenting unionization on lagged unionization(on the grounds
that serial correlation in the U variable is strong but isabsent from measure-
ment error), found that a longitudinal estimate of the unioneffect of .10
increased to .30 in the instrumental analysis. Their conclusion wasthat
"omitted quality variables bias the union effect upwards and the'old—style'
cross section estimates are of the right order of magnitudeafter all."
H. Gregg Lewis, (1983) in an evaluation of the effect ofmeasurement error on
union wages estimates, has also reached a conclusion similarto mine.
Dispersion of Wages
The proposition that trade union wage policies are designedto reduce ine-
quality of wages within firms and across firms forworkers doing similar work
has a long history in labor economics, stretching back to theWebbs. Numerous
cross—section comparisons of wage inequality have found that inequalityis less
in union than in nonunion settings (see, e.g., Hyclak 1977,1979; Freeman 1980,
1982; Hirsch 1982; Plotnick 1982). Standard wage regressionsprovide corro-
borating evidence, showing that for the most partthe impact of most wage-
determining variables is smaller on the wages of unionthan on the wages of
nonunion workers. The magnitude of the estimated union impactis sufficiently
sizable to suggest that, despite the increase in dispersiondue to union mono-
poly wage effects, unionism reduces overall inequalityof wages.
Do comparisons of dispersions of wages in a longitudinalframework con—26
firmthe cross—section results? How much smaller, if at all, is the eotimated
union effect on dispersion?
To answer these questions I have tabulated the standard deviation of the
log of earnings for workers by their change in union status in the four data
sets referred to earlier. The resulting calculations are given in Table 7,
which follows the same format as Table 6. As can be seen, the longitudinal
calculations confirm the cross—section finding of lower wage dispersion under
unionism. Dispersion tends to fall when workers join unions and decline when
they leave, confirming the reduction in dispersion under unionism. There are,
however, notable differences in the magnitude and consistency of the effects by
groups, the NU —NNand (NU —UN)/2comparisons showing larger union effects
than UU —UNcomparisons and with the PSID and QES showing more variable results
than the other samples. To compare the longitudinal estimates to cross—section
estimates, I have made some crude calculations of what a full cross-section ana-
lysis (which involves correcting observed differences in variances by observed
differences in characteristics) might yield by reducing the difference in stan-
dard deviations between UU and NN workers in the before and after data by 30%, a
figure consistent with a full analysis of May 1973-75 CPS data (Freeman 1980,
Table 4). Without the adjustment the impact of unionism on dispersion estimated
with the longitudinal data is much smaller than the impact estimated with the
cross—section data. With the adjustment, the longitudinal estimate is still
noticeably smaller, by magnitudes comparable to those obtained in Table 6 for
wages.
Finally, note that comparisons of the levels of the standard deviations
among groups tell a stronger story than did the comparison of the levels of
wages.8 In the before data, workers who leave unions have larger dispersionsTable_7
Standard Deviations of Log Wages, Changes in Standard
Deviations Associated with Changing Union Status, and
Estimated Union Effects
Standard Deviation
in Log Wages Group Estimated
Group and Survey Before After Union Effeç
A. May CPS, 1974—75
NN .59 .58 -.01 NU -NN -.08
NU .52 .43 —.09 UU —UN -.05
UU .38 .35—.03 (Nu —uN)/2 -.06
UN .46 .48 .02 cross—section —.15
B. National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, 1970-78
NN .47 .53 .06 Nil -NW -.10
NU .39 .35-.04 UU -UN -.13
UU .29 .30 .01 (Nu —uN)/2 —.09
UN .32 .46 .14 cross—section —.14
C. Quality of Employment Survey, 1973—77
NW .55 .55 .00 Nil -NN -.23
.52 .32—.20 UU —UN .03
UU .38 .36—.02 (u
—ui)/2 —.07
UN .54 .49—.05 cross—section —.13
D. Michigan PSID, 1970—79
NN .46 .53 .07 NU —NN -.15
Nil .45 .37-.08 UU -UN .01
UU .31 .30 —.01 (inj-uN)/2 —.03
UN .40 .38—.02 cross—section —.13
Source: Tabulated from the various surveys. Thecross—section effect is estimated
by taking 70 of the difference in standarddeviations between UU and NW
(averaged for before and after). This is an approcimatecorrection for
differing characteristics of union and nonunion workers.2b
thanthose who stay, and workers who join unions have larger dispersions than
nonunion workers who remain nonunion. In the after data, workers joining unions
have greater dispersion than workers who were always union members while workers
leaving unions have less dispersion than workers who remain nonunion. While
these patterns could be due to factors other than error in measuring union mem-
bership, they are consistent with a pure measurement error interpretation.
I conclude that, as with wages, the impact of unions on dispersion found
in cross—section studies is confirmed in a longitudinal analysis and that the
magnitude of the effect is commensurably lower, at least partly as a result of
error in measuring union status.
Fringe Benefits
The third cross-section finding which I examine with longitudinal data in
this paper is the finding that unionism increases the fringe component of com-
pensation, particularly those fringe benefits that are most desired by older
workers, such as pensions (for studies of fringe benefits, see Duncan 1976;
Goldstein and Pauly 1976; Donsimoni 1978; Soinick 1978; Leigh 1980; ViSCUSI
1980; Freeman 1981, 1983). As the QES is the only data set which provides
fringe benefit figures over time, my longitudinal analysis is limited to that
data set. I consider two measures of fringes, the number of fringes reported by
workers and the proportion with pensions.
Table 8 presents the results of a longitudinal analysis for these two
variables, again following the Table 6 format. While changes in the list of
fringes in the surveys causes the number of fringes reported for the majority of
workers to fall, the evidence shows that workers who went from nonunion to union
gained fringes, while those going from union to nonunion lost relative to those29
Table 8
Numbers of Fringes and Presence of Pensions, Changes in
Numbers of Fringes andPresenceof Pensions Associated
with Changing Union Status, and Estimated Union Effects,
QES, 1973—77
Group Estimated
Group Before After Union Effects
Number of fringes:
NN 3.01 2.56 —15 NU —NN 32%
NU 2.593.02 17 UU —UN 0%
UU 3.643.28 -10 (Nu —uN)/2 13%
UN 3.162.55 —10 cross—section 13%
Proportion of Workers with Pensions
NN .65 .70 .05 NU -NN .34
NU .55 .90 .35 UU -UN .02
UU .95 .96 .01 (mJ -UN)/2 .18
UN .78 .77—.01 cross—section .25
Source: Tabulated from Quality of Employment Panel, 1973—77. Pension figures
based on 429 NNs, 185 UUs,66UNs,and 48NUs.30
who remained union. The implied union effects are all positive, with, however,
considerable difference in magnitude. The NIJ —NNestimate, in particular,
greatly exceeds TIN —UU.The pension coverage figures show a similar pattern,
with a sizeable increase in the proportion with pensions for workers joining
unions but no real change for those leaving unions. Comparisons of the longitu-
dinal with the cross—section estimates show no difference for number of fringes
but the usual diminution of the union effect for provision of pensions.9
Finally, note that the pattern of differences in levels of fringes is similar to
that found in dispersion for comparisons of UN's or NV's or UU's but is mixed in
comparisons of changes with NN's.
Taking the results of Tables 6—8 as a whole, a reasonable generalization
is that longitudinal analyses confirm the qualitative findings of cross-
sectional analyses, with, however, smaller estimated union effects, possibly due
in large part to the greater impact of errors of measurement on longitudinal
than on cross—section statistics.
IV. Bounding the True Impact?
If, as researchers usually assume, there is a substantial selectivity
problem in cross—section analysis, which doniinate.s any problems of measurement
error, then cross—section estimates of union effects overstate true union
effects. The preceding sections show that if there is a substantial measurement
error problem in longitudinal analysis, and if there is no countervailing
problem of selectivity of changers, then longitudinal estimates of union effects
understate true union effects. When both of these statements are true, we have
an important "bounding" result:
Theorem: Under reasonable assumptions about the impact of measurementerror and of selectivity of persons into unions, cross—sectionestimite$ of
union effects provide an upper bound and longitudinal estimates provide alower
bound on the "true" union impact in the model under study.
To prove the theorem, it is necessary to show that (a) measurement error
biases longitudinal estimates downward to a greater extent than it does cross—
section estimates, which is done in Section II; (b) selectivity of unionistsin a
cross—section biases cross—section estimates upward more than measurement error
biases those estimates downward, which I shall assume on the basis of themodest
estimated effect of measurement error in the cross—section; and (c) selectivity
of who changes union status in longitudinal data either biases longitudinal
estimates downward or biases them upward by less than measurement error biases
them downward.
In this section I consider proposition (c).I examine the likely impact
of selectivity in who changes union status on longitudinal estimates of union
effects. I shall argue that under plausible modesl of the economics of
unionism, selectivity of changers biases longitudinal estimates of unioneffects
downward, reinforcing rather than weakening or offsetting the effectsof
measurement error. Hence, as long as (b) holds, the bounding theorem will be
valid.
Modelling Selectivity
There are two types of selectivity involved in who becomes union or
nonunion: workers' choice of working union (nonunion) jobs and employers'
choice of workers. I model selectivity on the part of workers, then examinehow
the analysis changes when employers select workers from the queue desiring union
jobs.32
Concider the workers' decision to itch from union to nonunion status
when theoutcomes are determined by
o=+ d.+a.+ (21) 3 3Jij
o a.+
N13 3 Ni,j
where°Uij =outcomefor jth worker in ith period (i =1,0) when
d =averageunion differential,
=differentialfor jth worker relative to average
differential with E(d) =0,
a =individual"ability" effect, and
=errorwhen jworksunion (nonunion) with expected values 0 and
variancesand c.




whereK measures cost of mobility. Assume a bivariate normal distribution of
the outcome variables. Then the truncated mean gain from working union is









+ + andwhere f/(1 —F)is the "inverse Mills" ratio cor-
rection for truncation. Equation (23) overstates the union differential because it
averages only over workers with especially high gains.
Similarly, for workers leaving unions, we obtain
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asthe expected mean change.
As our estimate of the union effect we take (1/2)(Nu —1114),which in the




whered is the union effect and the remaining components reflect selectivity of
changers. Assume, for simplicity, that = andthat there is a true union
effect d > 0. Then the selectivity bias is negative since
f[(K -d)/a]/[1-F()]< [(K +d)/a]/[1-f()]becausek +d> k -d.
If, as is plausible given our findings on dispersion, a <a, the negative bias
is enhanced. If, by contrast, d =0,and =
aN
,selectivityhas —-logically
enough --nosuch bias effect.1°
In this model if there is a union effect, the selectivity of changers
biases longitudinal estimates of that effect downward. Even if there is not, we
have established that selectivity on the part of workers does not bias upward
the longitudinal estimate and thus cannot offset the predicted downward bias
from measurement error.
What about selectivity by employers?
Rather than providing a detailed analysis of this question (which involves
complex double integrals), let us simply evaluate the qualitative impact of such
selectivity on our previous results. Since only union firms have a queue of
workers outside their plants, I assume that the only firm selectivity is selec-
tion of workers into union jobs. Firms will choose to hire workers with low
ds ——thatis, those for whom the true unioneffectis smallest (with a fixed
union wage effect, this involves picking workers with the highest productivity
——andtry to displace those with high d3s.
With respect to workers who join unions, employer selectivity will augment
the downward bias in the longitudinal estimate. This is because firms will be'1
selectinglower values of dNUj from the sample of workers for whom drUj >
K + — Thiswill reduce the inverse Mills ratio component of (23).
With respect to workers who leave union jobs, the easiest assumption is
that because of seniority rules, firms have no selectivity, leaving (24) as is.
If firms are able to select who leaves, however, there is an additional negative
bias component to (24), so that we can no longer sign the net effect of selec-
tivity in (25). For the bias in (25) to remain negative, it is necessary that
the effect of firm selectivity on who joins a union dominate the effect of firm
selectivity on who leaves. This is plausible given that firms are free to hire
whom they want but not to fire or lay off.
All told, our analysis of selectivity in who changes union status suggests
that, under reasonable selection criteria but simplified statistical assump-
tions, the longitudinal estimates of union effects will be biased downward,
establishing the bounding theorem.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to show that measurement error is a significant
problem in analysis of longitudinal data. I have developed some models of
measurement error, examined numerical examples, and estimated the impact of
measurement error in four data sets. My analysis has not been complete. I gave
only cursory treatment to issues of the correlation between the random component
of measurement error and control variables and ignored completely the potential
impact of standard exclusion rules (such as requiring positive wages and sen-
sible values of explanatory variables) on longitudinal as opposed to cross—
section analyses. These errors of omission aside, the analysis suggests that
longitudinal anlysis is not the research panacea it is sometimes seen to be.35
While omitted fixed effects bias upward cross—sectionestimates of union
effects, measurement error and possibly selectivityof changers bias downward
longitudinal estimates. Under reasonable conditions,the two sets of estimates
bound the true impact of unionism, snd thus should beviewed as complementary
research tools. While neither is likely to yield the true parameter,together
they enable us to estimate the magnitude ofthe effects of unionism, which
appear to be quite substantial in empiricalwork.3(
Footnotes
I have benefited from comments of seminar participants at the University of
Chicago, Caltech, Australia National University, and the University of
California, Irvine, and the suggestions of John Abowd, Gary Chamberlain, and H.
Gregg Lewis.
1The assumption that equal numbers of workers are misclassifiedimplies
that the observed proportion union is an unbiased estimate of the true propor-
tion. It is a useful simplifying assumption that appears consistent with actual
measurement error (see Table 3) but is not critical to the numeric example or to
the ensuing statistical analysis.
2Much of what follows is based on Marquis et al. (1981). I have also
benefited from Aigner (1973).







Multiply by (1—r )toobtain (1—rU-rN)(1-r )
>l—r— rN -r
But simplifying we obtain (r+ rN)r2 > 0, which proves the inequality.
41n the Januarysurvey there are two reported wages: one from the indi-
viduals, the other from employers. I have used the wage reported by the indivl—
duals in this analysis.
5Speoifically, the formulas with changes in the value of U between the











E(Nc)= E(M)+E(M)(1 - r-
rN)TC
+2ô
6The measurement ofwages varies across the data sets. In the CPS I
measure wages by the ratio of usual weekly earnings to usual weekly hours; in37
the PSID, I use average hourly wages; in the NLS, I usethe reported hourly
rate; while in the QES wages are annual earningsfrom work divided by hours
worked times 52.
71n regression analyses which impose N1J =UN,the coefficient is a
weighted average dependent on relative numbers changingstatus. The reader can
readily calculate weighted averages for contrast,if desired.
fullanalysis of the effect of measurement error or dispersiondiffers
somewhatfrom that of analysis of measurement error in the regressionformat,
but the qualitative effects of error are the same.
9The cross—section regression for number of fringes is based on
regressions using 635 persons with 10 occupation,6 industry, tenure, tenure
squared, education, race, sex, years of schooling,and marital status controls.
The regression for proportion with pensions is based onthe same sample and
model.
101 have benefited immensely from the comments of John Abowd in this sec-
tion. The statistical analysis which follows relies extensivelyon John Abowd
(1983).
We can also compare the bias in the NU —NNand UU —UNestimates.
Following the analysis in the text, we find thatthe mean for NN is
(f[(K -)/a]/{1-F[K-
sothat the mean for N1J -NN=+ {[(a+- 02/o*]f},(1-F),
which is less than d when + < which is likely since the dispersion of
ofwagesislessthan the dispersion ofnonunionwages. Hence, here too we have
anunderestimate.
12That is, a reasonable specification is d —Xa3, where a3 is our
ability indicator with E(a )0.38
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